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Distinguishing Between Coverage and
Treatment Decisions Under ERISA Health
Plans: What's Left of ERISA Preemption?
PHYLLIS C. BoRzIt
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, policymakers at every level of
government have grappled with the difficult question of
how to assure every American access to affordable health
insurance. Amid much fanfare and passion the great
Congressional debate occurred in 1993-1994 concerning the
Clinton Health Plan, centering on whether a national
solution or something less sweeping was necessary to
correct the weaknesses in our current health care delivery
system.' The inability of Congress and the Clinton

t Phyllis Borzi is Of Counsel at O'Donoghue & O'Donoghue, Washington,
D.C. and is also a Research Professor at the Center for Health Services
Research and Policy, School of Public Health and Health Services, The George
Washington University Medical Center, where she is the co-director of the
Hirsh Law and Policy Program. Ms. Borzi wishes to express her gratitude to
Gregory Moore, an associate at O'Donoghue & ODonoghue, for his invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article. In addition, Ms. Borzi expresses
her thanks to Marc I. Machiz of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Washington,
D.C., for his input and assistance with an earlier paper from which portions of
this article have been adapted.
1. The Clinton Health Plan was introduced in Congress in 1993 as the
Health Security Act. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993). Under the Clinton plan,
employers would be required to offer and contribute to the cost of coverage for
all employees and their families, unemployed individuals would be covered
through state-organized but privately run health alliances, and early retirees
would be covered under the expanded Medicare program. One alternative
approach was a single-payer proposal introduced by Representative James
McDermott, the American Health Security Act of 1993. H.R. 1200, 103d Cong.
(1993). Under H.R. 1200, all Americans would be covered under a single health
plan and employer coverage would be eliminated. Another alternative was the
Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, introduced by the late
Senator John Chafee. S. 1770, 103d Cong. (1993). Under S. 1770, all individuals
would have to purchase insurance, and employers would have to make health
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Administration to reach a consensus resulted in the
collapse of this major public policy effort. When the rhetoric
died down and the dust settled, the American people
continued to receive their health care in ways similar to
those of the past-largely through workplace-based group
health plans.
One of the most potent weapons to inflame public
opinion used by those who opposed the Clinton plan was the
threat that it would force millions of Americans into
managed care organizations (primarily health maintenance
organizations or HMOs), whose reputation for ruthless
bottom-line-driven decisionmaking was a cause for concern
for ordinary citizens all across the country.2 Denied the
flexibility to choose their health care providers and health
plans,3 the argument went, individuals would be left to the
mercy of a government-run bureaucracy in which health
care decisions would be made by green eye-shade types or,
worse yet, faceless folk manning toll-free telephone
numbers thousands of miles away from where care would
be delivered.4
Ironically, despite the spectacular failure of the Clinton
Health Plan, since 1994 millions of Americans have been
forced into managed care organizations by dint of the
marketplace itself and, in particular, the rising cost of
health care for employers.' Faced with this reality,
coverage available to employees but would not be required to contribute to that
coverage.
2. See THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG 137-38 (1996) (discussing HIAA's
"Harry and Louise" advertising campaign); David R. Olmos, Survey Finds Wide
Distrustof HMO Care, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at Al.
3. The percentage of workers with the unlimited right to choose their
medical providers under their employer-sponsored health plans has fallen from
90% in 1988 to 21% in 2000. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. AND HEALTH
RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2000 ANNUAL SURVEY

55 Ex. 5.1 (2000) [hereinafter KAISER SURVEY]. The percentage of employers
providing their workers with a choice of health plans varies by firm size. For
instance, currently in 91% of all firms with 3-199 workers, only one health plan
is offered. Id. at 56 Ex. 5.3. Only 6% of those firms offer employees the choice of
two plans and only 3% a choice of three or more plans. Id. In contrast, only 16%
of all firms with 5000 or more employees offer only one health plan; 17% of
those firms offer two plans and 67% offer three or more plans. Id.
4. See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON'T
PANDER 130, 137-38 (2000); SKOCPOL, supra note 2, at 137-38.
5. In 1988, 16% of all workers with health insurance were in HMOs. KAISER
SURVEY, supra note 3, at 67 Ex. 6.1. In 1993, that number had risen to 21%. Id.
In 2000, 29% of workers are in HMOs. Id. Health care premiums increased at a
rate of 12% in 1988. Id. at 15 Ex. 2.2. Interestingly, in the mid-1990s, the rate
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consumers have become increasingly concerned about the
managed care plans decide to provide or withhold
way that
6
care.
Traditionally, regulation of the business of insurance
and the delivery of health care has been within the purview
of the states, with the McCarran-Ferguson Act 7 providing
the statutory authority for states to enact strong consumer
protection laws and to deploy an arsenal of weapons to
enforce those laws. With the enactment of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),8 however,
many state consumer protections have been struck down as
they apply to employer-sponsored group health plans.' The
legal basis for nullification of these protections is § 514 of
ERISA. With a few narrow exceptions, § 514 preempts all
state laws that "relate to" an employee benefit plan.1"
Initially courts interpreted ERISA broadly, holding
most state laws preempted." In recent decisions, however,
the Supreme Court has taken a closer look at challenged
state laws and pointed the way to a more balanced
evaluation of whether a state has overstepped its bounds in
trying to protect consumers. 2 At the same time that the
courts have restricted state consumer protection activity,
judicial interpretations have limited the scope of ERISA's
of increase dropped, resulting in an 8.5% increase in 1993 and a mere 0.8%
increase in 1996. Id. At the time, there was speculation that this drop reflected
an artificial depression of costs during the Congressional debate on health care
reform in order to forestall legislation, rather than a true decrease in costs.
Since 1996, costs have skyrocketed with monthly premiums in 2000 showing an
8.3% increase. Id. at 15 Ex. 2.2. In 2000, the average monthly premium is $202
for single coverage and $529 for family coverage. Id. at 2. The increase in
premiums (8.3% between spring 1999 and summer 2000) was more than five
percentage points higher than the rate of inflation. Id.
6. See U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF., EMPLOYER-BASED MANAGED CARE PLANS:
ERISA's EFFECT ON REMEDIES FOR BENEFIT DENIALS AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
15-16 (1998).
7. 79 Pub. L. No. 15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-1015 (1994)).
8. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
9. See generally Donald T. Bogan, ProtectingPatientRights Despite ERISA:
Will the Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 951, 996-1003 (2000).
10. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
11. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 506-10 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing Supreme Court's
initial preemption jurisprudence).
12. E.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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protections. 3 In particular, the Supreme Court has
narrowly construed the remedies available for injuries
caused by the negligence or unreasonableness of plans in
their decisions about whether a particular service or
treatment is covered by the plan. 4
This article chronicles that change, and describes how
the courts have sought to keep pace with developments in
the health care industry in spite of the constraints of a
statute written for an entirely different health care delivery
system. The article also addresses the implications of recent
judicial trends for participants who seek to hold ERISAcovered group health plans accountable for their decisionmaking activities.
I. BACKGROUND
More than 158 million individuals were covered under
employer-sponsored group health plans in America in
1999.' This represents 73.3% of the workforce, or about
two-thirds of the entire non-elderly population." The great
majority of those workers and their families are covered
under group health plans subject to ERISA. 7
ERISA covers all types of employer-sponsored employee
benefit plans. 8 Section 3(1) of ERISA defines these plans as
"any plan, fund, or program" established or maintained by
an employer, an employee organization, or both, to provide

13. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (holding that
only traditional equitable relief, such as injunctive remedies, disgorgement, and
restitution, is available under ERISA § 502(a)(3), not money damages);
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (holding
that extra-contractual compensatory or punitive damages are not available
under ERISA § 502(a)(2)).
14. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
15. PAUL FRONSTIN, SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF

THE UNINSURED 4 tbl.1 (Employee Benefits Research Institute, Issue Brief No.
228, 2000).
16. Id. at 6 chart 4.
17. In 1999, 163.8 million individuals received coverage under private sector
ERISA health plans out of a total 240.7 million Americans with health
insurance. Paul Fronstin, Job-Based Health Benefits Continue to Rise While
UninsuredRate Declines, EBRI NOTES, Nov. 2000, at 4 tbl.4.
18. The "employee welfare benefit plan," ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
(1994), and the "employee pension benefit plan," id. § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2),
are the two main categories of employee benefit plan.
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participants and beneficiaries with certain specified
benefits. 9 Employee welfare benefit plans provide:
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical,
surgical or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship fuids, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any
benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions
20
on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).

ERISA-covered health plans, which may be insured or selfinsured, comprise the largest group of welfare plans.2
In terms of substantive requirements for group health
plans, ERISA mandates certain reporting, disclosure,
fiduciary, claims dispute, and health insurance continuation
requirements." ERISA also limits preexisting condition
exclusions and mandates certain other aspects of plan
design. These rules are designed to ensure that participants
in those plans are fairly treated.24 In addition, ERISA § 502
generally provides for civil enforcement mechanisms,
including authorizing private rights of action and, under
some circumstances, actions brought by the U.S. Secretary of
Labor.25
When Congress enacted ERISA, it intended to retain
broad federal regulatory authority over all employee benefit
plans covered under the Act. The sweeping language of
ERISA's preemption clause reflects this intention. Section
514(a) of ERISA preempts any state law that "relates to" an
employee benefit plan," unless the state law falls within the
"savings" clause.' State laws that escape preemption by
virtue of the savings clause include state insurance,
19. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). An "employer" includes a group or
association of employers. Id. § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5).
20. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE
PRIvATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1997, at 4 tbl.1 (1999).

22. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114, 1133, 1161-1169 (1994 & Supp.
HI 1997).
23. See id. §§ 1181-1183, 1185-1185b, 1191-1191c.
24. See ERISA § 2(a)-(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)-(c) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
25. Id. § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)
26. See id. § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994 & Supp. IV 1997).
27. Id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
28. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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banking, and securities laws, 29 as well as generally
applicable criminal laws."° Under the so-called "deemer"
clause,3" however, states cannot define employee benefit
plans to be insurance companies in order to use the state
the general
insurance law exception to circumvent
32
prohibition on state regulation of plans.
As a result, ERISA-covered employee benefit plans,
whether insured or self-insured, are subject to federal
regulation and are immune from direct state regulation.
However, as discussed later in this article, ERISA-covered
plans may be affected indirectly by state insurance
regulation.
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 most
employees were covered by fee-for-service plans. 33 Firms
generally covered their employees through insured health
plans, such as the traditional Blue Cross/Blue Shield major
medical and outpatient coverage.34 Only the largest
employers self-insured health benefits. 5 Self-insured health
plans were also generally administered in-house. Some staff
model HMOs existed (particularly in California where
Kaiser was popular), but there was not the wide variety of
managed care organizations that are available today in the
marketplace."
In the 1980s, escalating costs led many employers to
move away from a traditional fee-for-service or indemnity
system and toward various types of managed care
29. Id., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) ("nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities").
30. Id. § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4).
31. Id. § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
32. See Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 619, 648-49 (1994) (discussing events contemporaneous with the drafting
of ERISA "precipitat[ing] concern over the potential for state interference with
the proposed law").
33. See Bogan, supra note 9, at 997-98.
34. See id. at 998-99.
35. "Self-insurance" means that the plan sponsor bears the insurance risk
itself instead of transferring the risk to another entity, such as an insurer or
HMO, and simply paying that entity a premium or a capitation fee for providing
employee coverage. For example, if claims experience is worse than anticipated,
the plan sponsor in a self-insured plan has to absorb the loss. Self-insured plans
may be either "funded" (the money to pay claims is set aside in a separate trust
or other arrangement) or "unfunded" (the money to pay claims comes out of the
general assets of the plan sponsor).
36. See Bogan, supra note 9, at 998-99.

2001]

ERISA PREEMPTION

1225

arrangements." Employers were attracted to managed care
because it held the promise of delivering better and more
comprehensive medical care in a more cost-effective
manner.
Although some employers have completely
abandoned their former indemnity plans and moved their
employees
into closed
panel health
maintenance
organizations (HMOs) or preferred provider organizations
(PPOs), most moved slowly to introduce managed care
features.39 More recently, employers have shifted away from
the more tightly managed arrangements to accommodate
employee complaints that a greater degree of flexibility in
choosing health care providers is needed.
Managed care organizations (MCOs) operate through a
series of interlocking and overlapping legal relationshipsprimarily those between the employer and the MCO and the
MCO and its providers.4 ' These relationships are
circumscribed by agreements and contracts.42 Although a few
contract provisions may be required to comply with state law,
the specific language of the contract and the respective
allocation of rights and responsibilities is generally left to the
parties to negotiate.
The shift from fee-for-service to managed care has given
rise to new arrangements for financing and delivering
health care that were not contemplated by the framers of
ERISA. Although managed care organizations may not be
called "insurance companies," many do perform the same
risk-bearing functions that have long characterized the
business of insurance.43 The types of risk to be borne and
37. See id. at 998; Sara L. Broyhill, Comment, Death of a Remedy: The
Supreme Court's Ill-FatedDecision to Foreclose an Avenue of Liability Against
Managed Care Organizations Under ERISA in Pegram v. Herdrich, 79 NEB. L.
REV. 762, 763-65 (2000).
38. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., FUNDAAIENTALS

OF EMPLOYEE

BENEFIT PROGRAIS 235 (5th ed. 1997) [hereinafter EBRI FUNDAAMNTALS].
39. Id. at 239-40.
40. The percentage of workers covered under point-of-service health plans
(i.e., those permitting them to choose to receive treatment from non-network
providers) more than doubled between 1988 and 2000 (from 21% to 44%).
KAISER SURVEY, supranote 3, at 55 Ex. 5.1.
41. See Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort
Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219,
1223-25 (1997) (discussing basic MCO models).
42. See id.
43. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) issued a
bulletin in 1995 on insurance licensure for risk-bearing entities, which include,
for example, various forms of provider-sponsored organizations. See, e.g., NAIC
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the degree to which risk is shifted under the structure of
these new entities are evolving as the marketplace changes.
Yet despite this change in the health insurance
marketplace and the emergence of a wide variety of riskbearing entities that are not traditional insurance
companies, ERISA's original statutory preemption language
remains largely intact. As states have sought to assert their
traditional role as regulators of insurers and protectors of
consumers of health insurance, ERISA preemption provided
a virtually impenetrable shield for these new entities.
Indeed, until 1995, judicial precedent supported the view of
many ERISA experts that the reach of ERISA preemption
was virtually limitless and that state statutes that even
indirectly impacted ERISA plans would be invalidated."
Since 1995, however, several important Supreme Court
preemption decisions have signaled a potential change in
the Court's thinking, 5 and now most legal experts have
concluded that ERISA's preemptive sweep is not as broad
as they once thought, particularly when it comes to state
regulation of health plans. 6
II. THE SCOPE OF ERISA PREEMPTION

A. General Framework for Analysis
The starting point for analysis of whether ERISA
preempts state law is, of course, the statutory language of
ERISA itself. The analytic framework set forth in ERISA §
514 must be applied to the language of the state law. The
lesson of the ERISA preemption cases (particularly the
recent Supreme Court cases) is that the state's choice of
words is important. Both legal and factual analyses are

Creates Body of Regulation to Address Managed Care Entities, 3 Health Care
Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 40 (Oct. 9, 1995); Health Attorneys Very Supportive of Risk
Bearing Entities Bulletin, 3 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 37 (Sept. 18, 1995);
Provider-Sponsored Organizations Evolving into Major Risk-Bearing
Intermediaries,9 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 539 (Apr. 2, 2001).
44. See generally NAT'L ASS'N INS. CoMi'RS, THE REGULATION OF HEALTH

RISK-BEARING ENTITIES (1997) (discussing risk assumed by organizations in the

health insurance market and states' regulatory activities).
45. See ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
LAW 793-95 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW].
46. See, e.g., Preemption:Experts Say Travelers Decision Could Mean Rise
in State Regulations, 23 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 162 (Jan. 15, 1996).
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critical in determining whether a challenged state law will
be preempted.
B. The "Relateto" Clause
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA will
"[s]upersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described
in [ERISA] section 4(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1003 (a)] and not
exempt under [ERISA] section 4(b) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)]."47
A state includes "[a] State, any political subdivisions
thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which
purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and
conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
subchapter." 48 State laws include "[aill laws, decisions,
rules, regulations' ' 9 or other State action having the effect of
law, of any State 2
C. The "Savings"Clause
The savings clause is an exception to the general rule
preempting state laws that relate to an employee benefit
plan. As noted above, the statute saves from preemption
state laws that regulate insurance, banking, or securities."
Insurance laws continue to be the most significant of the
three, both in terms of their substantive reach and the
number of ERISA preemption challenges that have been
raised. 1 As states have broadened access to health
insurance for the uninsured 2 and responded to consumer

47. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
48. Id. § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2).
49. Id. § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1). Additionally, ERISA § 514
provides that "[a] law of the United States, applicable only to the District of
Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather than a law of the United
States." Id., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
50. Id. § 514 (b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) ("nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities").
51. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 45, at 799-804.
52. See, e.g., Preemption: Welfare Fund Challenges State Law to Provide
Health Care to Uninsured, 19 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1612 (Sept. 14, 1992);
Advisory Council: ERISA Challenge to Massachusetts Law Would Be
Irresponsible, McDonough Says, 15 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1159 (July 18,
1988).
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backlash against managed care, 53 state insurance regulation
has become a lightning rod for legal challenges based on
preemption.
D. The "Deemer"Clause
The deemer clause is a limitation on the savings clause.
It is designed to prevent states from circumventing the
general prohibition on state regulation of employee benefit
plans by preventing states from regulating employee
benefit plans under the guise of regulating insurance. The
clause provides that:
[Nleither an employee benefit plan... nor any trust established
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust, company, or investment company or to
be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of
any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.

E. Conventional Preemption Principles Apply to ERISA
Cases
1. Conflict Preemption. Quite apart from ERISA's own
preemptive effect, ordinary preemption jurisprudence
recognizes an independent basis for preemption if a state
law conflicts with the federal regulatory scheme. In Boggs
v. Boggs,55 for example, the Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to determine if Louisiana community property
law "related to" employee benefit plans because applying
the state law would conflict with specific ERISA
provisions."
Boggs involved a challenge to the right of the surviving
second wife (Sandra) to a deceased participant's pension
53. See, e.g., Managed Care: Reform of Medicare Payment System, HMO
Backlash, Seen as Top 1997 Issues, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 197 (Jan. 20,
1997); State Reforms: Major Changes in Health Care System Under Study
During Tumultuous Period, 22 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1606 (July 10, 1995);
Michael Gordon, Managed Care, ERISA Preemption, and Health Reform-The
CurrentOutlook, 22 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 852 (Apr. 3, 1995).
54. Id. § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
55. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
56. Id. at 844 ("In the face of this direct clash between state law and the
provisions and objectives of ERISA, the state law cannot stand.").
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benefits. The challenge was brought by the sons from the
participant's first marriage, whose deceased mother
(Dorothy) had made a purported testamentary transfer of
her interest in their father's pension benefits. At issue was
the validity of Louisiana's community property law, which
allowed a non-participant spouse to transfer an interest in
undistributed pension benefits by testamentary instrument.
Although state law has traditionally governed the
disposition of community property, the Court concluded
that the clear intent of Congress in passing the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984 (REA)57 was to preempt state laws that
purported to divide a participant's pension in a manner that
conflicted with federal law.58 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy stated that Boggs was a simple case of
conflict preemption. Absent a valid waiver, REA provided
that the surviving spouse was entitled to the qualified joint
and survivor annuity (QJSA). Because no one, not even the
participant spouse during his lifetime, could deprive Sandra
of her right to the QJSA without her consent, Dorothy had
no interest in the undistributed pension benefits to pass on
to her sons.59 Louisiana's community property law was,
therefore, preempted by ERISA. °
As the Court explained, there was no need to apply the
"relates to" language in § 514:
In the face of this direct clash between state law and the
provisions and objectives of ERISA, the state law cannot stand.
Conventional conflict preemption principles require preemption
"where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility,... or where state law stands as an obstacle

to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."... In part, it would undermine the
purpose of ERISA's mandated survivor's annuity to allow Dorothy,
the predeceasing spouse, by her testamentary transfer to defeat
Sandra's entitlement to the annuity § 1055 guarantees her as the
surviving spouse. This cannot 61be. States are not free to change
ERISA's structure and balance.

57. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
58. See 520 U.S. at 843.
59. Id. at 843.
60. Id. at 841.
61. Id. at 844 (quoting Gade v. Natl Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
98 (1992)).
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It is more problematic to apply conflict preemption
principles when state law is specifically saved from ERISA
preemption. The savings clause, by its terms, applies to all
of Title I of ERISA, not just to the express preemption
provision in § 514.62 Nonetheless, when the requirements of
ERISA specifically conflict with state insurance law, federal
rules prevail. For example, in John Hancock Mutual Life v.
Harris Trust,63 the Supreme Court held that ERISA's
fiduciary provisions superseded state regulation of an
insurance company's general account, where the general
account was comprised, in part, of employee benefit plan
assets.
We are satisfied that Congress did not order the unqualified
deferral to state law that Hancock advocates and attributes to the
federal lawmakers. Instead, we hold, ERISA leaves room for
complementary or dual federal and state regulation, and calls for
federal supremacy
when the two regimes cannot be harmonized or
64
accommodated.

The most controversial use of conflict preemption to
supersede state insurance law is the Supreme Court's
decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeau. 65 In Pilot
Life, the Court preempted a common law cause of action for
the bad faith processing of an insurance claim. The Court
performed a conventional savings clause analysis to
conclude that the state law before it was not a "law
regulating insurance" within the meaning of the savings
clause. The Court then bolstered its holding by stating in
dicta that Congress clearly intended to make exclusive
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme. That intent, the Court
believed, was inconsistent with any state law granting
participants and beneficiaries additional remedies, even
laws used to enforce insurance contract terms that could be
applied indirectly to ERISA-covered employee benefit plans
under ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) (the savings clause):
The deliberate care with which ERISA's civil enforcement
remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in
62. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994) ("[Nolthing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.").
63. 510 U.S. 86 (1993).
64. Id. at 98.

65. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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its choice of remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that
ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive.
This conclusion is fully confirmed by the legislative history of the
civil enforcement provision. The legislative history demonstrates
that the pre-emptive force of § 502(a) was modeled after § 301 of
the [Labor-Management Relations Act of 19471.66

The reasoning reflected in the dicta of Pilot Life has
been used to invalidate bad faith claims that were clearly
based on state insurance law." More recently, Pilot Life was
relied on in Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas
68 to invalidate a state mandated
Department of Insurance
administrative system of external review of health claims
denials by health insurers covering ERISA plan
participants and beneficiaries.69
Although conflict preemption seems safely ensconced in
ERISA jurisprudence, the express savings clause in §
514(b)(2)(A) provides a means for attacking the validity and
scope of Pilot Life's sweeping conclusions about the
exclusive nature of ERISA's remedies. In UNUM Life
Insurance Co. of America v. Ward,"° the Supreme Court
noted, but did not reach, the Solicitor General's suggestion
that this aspect of Pilot Life should be revisited.' Several
federal appellate courts, however, have addressed the issue.
The Second Circuit has flatly stated that "[i]t would be
quixotic to rule that a claim under a state statute that is
saved from ERISA preemption, with the result that the
claim may not be removed to federal court, may nonetheless
be enforced only via ERISA provisions and remedies.7 2
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit panel that denied rehearing
in the Corporate Health case suggested that a state
substantive right to coverage of "medically necessary"
conditions as defined by state insurance law rather than
contract might be enforced through a state procedure
66. Id. at 54.
67. See, e.g., Kanne v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F. 2d 489, 493-94 (9th
Cir. 1989).
68. 215 F.3d 526, 538-39, reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 220 F.3d 641 (5th
Cir. 2000).
69. But see Moran v. Rush Prudential, 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000)
(upholding a state's external review procedure).
70. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
71. Id. at 376 n.7.
72. Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144, 151
(2d Cir. 1995).
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(implicitly offering state remedies) without running afoul of
ERISA preemption. 3 No area of ERISA preemption doctrine
bears closer watching than this one.
2. Complete Preemption. During the same term as Pilot
Life, the Supreme Court decided Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Taylor.74 In Taylor, the Court relied on the
reasoning of Pilot Life and upheld removal jurisdiction of a
suit challenging the denial of disability benefits by an
insurer-including damages and remedies unavailable
under ERISA-based on Congress's clearly expressed intent
that benefits claims under ERISA be found to arise under
federal law in the same manner as contract claims under §
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).7" As
in Pilot Life, the Court found the state law in question to be
outside the scope of ERISA's savings clause. The Court
seemed to suggest that this conclusion was not as critical to
its holding as the intent of Congress that ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) should be the exclusive means for challenging a
benefit decision. 6 If the Court were, in effect, to overrule
the position it expressed in dicta in Pilot Life-that
ERISA's remedial provisions were exclusive-and conclude
that enforcement mechanisms associated with a saved state
law are not preempted by ERISA, this would require a
reevaluation as well of the the scope of ERISA's removal
jurisdiction, because the state laws containing those
enforcement tools would no longer be completely preempted
and claims under those laws removable to federal court.
Federal courts commonly face ERISA preemption
questions as questions of removal jurisdiction. While there
is some confusion among the lower courts, the question
whether a participant's claim is completely preempted is
analytically distinct from the question of whether a claim is
preempted by ERISA § 514, or even whether a claim
conflicts with ERISA, as in Boggs." Only claims that
Congress clearly intends to fall exclusively within ERISA's
remedial provisions will be found to be completely
preempted. Accordingly, a court should make a
73. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641, 644-45
(5th Cir. 2000).
74. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
75. Id. at 65.
76. Id. at 64-66.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 55-61 (discussing Boggs).
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determination of complete preemption (and hence removal
jurisdiction) without considering the application of ERISA §
514. Furthermore, the remand of a case because the
plaintiffs claim is not "completely preempted" does not
control the state court's consideration of a preemption
defense."8

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW OF WHEN STATE LAWS
"RELATE To" EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

A. State Laws Having a "Connection with or Reference to"
an ERISA Plan "Relateto" a Plan
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 9 the Supreme Court
held that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in
the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with
or reference to such a plan." Shaw involved a challenge to a
section of the New York Human Rights Law8 that
prohibited discrimination in employee benefit plans on the
basis of pregnancy. 2 Before Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)," Delta had maintained a
welfare benefit plan that did not provide benefits to
employees disabled by pregnancy, although it did cover
other types of disabilities. The New York law made it
unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against [an]
78. See In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1999).

79. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).

80. Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S.
52, 58-60 (1990) (holding that state anti-subrogation law, which interfered with
plan design and calculation of benefit levels, "relates to" a plan and is
preempted); Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140-41 (1990) (holding
that wrongful discharge claim based on allegation that employer wrongfully
discharged employee to avoid contributions under pension plan was preempted
because it "relates to" a plan); Alessi v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 522-26 (1981) (holding that a New Jersey law that prohibited workers'
compensation benefits from being used to offset pension benefits "relates to"
ERISA-covered pension plans and is preempted).
81. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296.1(a) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1982-1983)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex). The New York Court of Appeals
earlier held that a private employer whose employee benefit plan treats
pregnancy differently from other nonoccupational disabilities engages in sex
discrimination within the meaning of N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.1(a). Brooklyn
Union Gas Co. v. N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 359 N.E.2d 393 (N.Y.
1976).
82. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108.
83. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
84. 463 U.S. at 92.
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individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or
privileges of employment" on the basis of sex. 5 Federal law
defined sex-based discrimination to include discrimination
"Ib]ecause of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions" 6 and required that women
affected by these conditions "be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."87
Because the New York law directly referred to and
implicated benefit plans (including ERISA-covered plans),
the Court held that the state law "related to" an employee
benefit plan.8 Although the state argued that its law was
saved from preemption because ERISA does not preempt
other federal laws (the PDA had subsequently been enacted
by Congress and it explicitly preserved certain state laws),
the Court held that to the extent that the New York law
went further than the federal PDA, it was preempted."
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
FMC Corp. v. Holliday.9 " There, FMC challenged provisions
of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law that precluded reimbursement from a claimant's tort
recovery for benefit payments by "'[a]ny program, group
contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits."'1
FMC's self-insured medical plan had a subrogation clause
that required participants to reimburse the plan for
benefits if they recovered on a liability claim against a third
party.92 Mr. Holliday brought a successful negligence action
against another driver for injuries suffered by his daughter.
FMC notified Mr. Holliday that the plan must be
reimbursed. The Hollidays refused, citing the Pennsylvania
law.
The Court held that the state law "related to" ERISA
plans because it had both a "reference to" benefit plans
governed by ERISA93 and a "connection with"94 these plans:
85. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296.1(a).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (§ 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, added
by § 1 of the PDA)).
87. Id.
88. 463 U.S. at 96-100.
89. Id. at 100-06.
90. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
91. Id. at 59 (quoting 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1719 (1987)).
92. Id. at 54.
93. Id. at 59. ('The statute states that '[in actions arising out of the
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Pennsylvania's antisubrogation law prohibits plans from being
structured in a manner requiring reimbursement in the event of
recovery from a third party. It requires plan providers to calculate
benefit levels in Pennsylvania based on expected liability
conditions that differ from those in States that have not enacted
similar antisubrogation legislation. Application of differing state
subrogation laws to plans would therefore frustrate plan
administrators' continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefit
levels nationwide. 95

Although the Court also found that the Pennsylvania law
fell within the scope of ERISA's insurance savings clause,
the deemer clause prevented the savings clause from being
applied to FMC's self-insured plan.96
B. State Laws Premised on the Existence of a Plan "Relate
to" a Plan
The Supreme Court has held that even state laws which
indirectly affect employee plans may be preempted. In
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,Inc.," the Court found that
the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act, which
expressly prohibited the offset of workers' compensation
benefits by pension benefits, was preempted.98 The New
Jersey law stated that "'[t]he right of compensation granted
by this chapter may be set off against disability pension
benefits or payments, but shall not be set off against
employees' retirement pension benefits or payments."' The
Raybestos-Manhattan plan offset an employee's retirement
benefits by the amount of workers' compensation benefits
received. Two former employees sued in state court to
prohibit this reduction in benefits.
Overturning the district court's determination that the
offset caused a forfeiture of pension benefits forbidden by
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or
reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to... benefits...
paid or payable under section 1719.'") (quoting 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1720
(1987)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 60.
96. Id. at 60-61.
97. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
98. Id. at 524-25.
99. Id. at 508 (quoting N.J. STAT ANN. § 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980-1981) (as
amended by 1977 N.J. Laws 176)).
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ERISA, the Third Circuit held the state law to be
preempted. 00 The Supreme Court affirmed the Third
Circuit's decision, even though the state argued that it was
only trying to protect workers' compensation benefits, not
regulate plans."' The New Jersey law "related to" ERISAcovered plans, the Supreme Court held, because it
eliminated a method of calculating pension benefits that
was permitted by federal law.0 2 Despite its intentions, then,
New Jersey was "intrud[ing] indirectly, through a workers'
compensation law, rather than
directly, through a statute
01 3
called 'pension regulation."

C. State Laws Specifically Exempting ERISA Plans "Relate
to" a Plan
State laws may "relate to" an employee benefit plan
even when they exempt such a plan from otherwise
applicable rules. In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc.,0 a Georgia garnishment statute singled out
ERISA-covered welfare plans for special treatment not
accorded to non-ERISA plans.0 5 The Georgia law prevented
creditors, such as Lanier Collection Agency, from enforcing
a money judgment by garnishing a debtor's benefits under
an ERISA-covered plan. The Georgia law provided that
"'[flunds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee
benefit plan or program subject to the provisions of the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
as amended, shall not be subject to the process of
garnishment, unless.., such garnishment is based upon a
judgment for alimony or child support

.'""

The Supreme

100. Buczynski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980), affd sub
nom., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504(1981).
101. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523-24.
102. Id. at 505.
103. Id.; see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139-40
(1990) (holding that Texas wrongful discharge law may be preempted, even
though it is not specifically designed to affect such plans or the effect is indirect,
because the cause of action is premised on the existence of a plan); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that, although Mississippi
common-law breach of contract and tort claims action for bad faith processing of
claims was not directed at employee benefit plans, it was nevertheless
preempted because it purported to expand ERISA's exclusive remedies).
104. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
105. Id. at 829.
106. Id. at 828 n.2 (quoting GA. CODE ANN.§ 18-4-22.1 (1982)).
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Court held that, although the Georgia law was designed to
shield ERISA-covered plans from otherwise applicable state
law, the express reference to ERISA plans caused the law to
be preempted because it "related to" plans."' As the Court
noted, "legislative 'good intentions' do not save a state law
within the broad pre-emptive scope of § 514(a)." 1°8
D. Limits on the Reach of the "Relatesto" Clause
Notwithstanding the breadth of ERISA's preemption
clause, the Supreme Court has set some limits on it. In
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Court stated that "[slome
state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a
finding that the law 'relates to' the plan."0 9 Since Shaw, the
courts have struggled to determine when a state action is
too remote or too tenuous to "relate to" an ERISA plan.
Although the Court struck down the provision of the
Georgia garnishment statute that singled out ERISAcovered pension plans for protection in Mackey, it held that
the general garnishment provisions were not preempted as
they applied to employee welfare benefit plans.' More
recently, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,"' the Court held
that a New York statute that imposed hospital surcharges
on commercial insurers and HMOs, but not on Blue
Cross/Blue Shield,"' did not "relate to" ERISA-covered
employee benefit plans and was not preempted."' The Court
found that the state statute involved an area of traditional
state regulation and had only an indirect economic effect on
choices made by plans."' Additionally, the state law did not
bind plan administrators to any particular choice or
preclude uniform administrative practices."5

107. Id. at 829-30.
108. Id. at 830.
109. 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983); see also District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1 (1992) (citing Shaw and
Mackey).
110. 486 U.S. at 831-32.
111. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
112. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c (McKinney 1993).
113. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
114. Id. at 660-62.
115. Id. at 659-62.
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IV. TRAVELERS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE SUPREME
COURT?

Despite the sweeping language of ERISA § 514 and the
Supreme Court's own decisions involving the reach of the
"relates to" clause, the Court has recognized some limits on
federal preemption as an outgrowth of Shaw's admonition
that if a state law's impact on ERISA plans is "too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral"'16 the state law could survive a
preemption challenge.
In Travelers,"7 the Court reconsidered the issue of
limits on ERISA preemption. Travelers involved several
challenges to a New York statute that imposed hospital
surcharges on hospital bills paid by third-party payers
(including commercial insurers and HMOs) but not on bills
paid by Blue Cross/Blue Shield ("the Blues").118 The
surcharges were primarily used to compensate hospitals for
uncompensated care expenses." 9 One surcharge of 13% was
imposed on hospital patients covered by any form of health
insurance other than the Blues, a health maintenance
organization, or a government plan (such as Medicare).
Another 11% surcharge applied to payments made by
commercial insurers. A third surcharge only applied to
HMOs. It varied based on the number of Medicaid enrollees
in an HMO and could be as high as 9% of the HMO's
aggregate
payments for in-patient monthly hospital
20
charges.
The plaintiffs (which included commercial insurers,
HMOs, and trade associations representing these groups)
argued that to the extent that the New York hospital
surcharges were paid in connection with ERISA-covered
plans, they "related to" employee benefit plans and thus
were preempted by ERISA. After consolidating the various
actions that had been filed, the district court found that the
surcharges were preempted by ERISA because of their
indirect effect on ERISA-covered plans (i.e., increasing the
costs of health insurance provided by issuers other than the

116. 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
117. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
118. See id. at 649 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c (McKinney 1993)).
119. See id., 514 U.S. at 650.
120. See id.
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Blues).12' In addition, the district court found that the
surcharges were not saved from preemption under ERISA §
514(b) as laws regulating insurance.'22 Therefore, the
district court enjoined the state from enforcing the
surcharges against commercial insurers or HMOs in
connection
with their coverage of patients in ERISA
plans."
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the defendants'
arguments that the surcharges were laws of general
application and that their indirect economic effect was not
substantial enough to affect the structure or administration
of the plans.124 Relying on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington
Board of Trade,25 the appellate court affirmed the district
court's decision."6 In doing so, the Second Circuit expressly
rejected its holding in Rebaldo v. Cuomo.1"' The circuit court
found that Rebaldo, which held that ERISA does not
preempt New York hospital rate-setting regulations
governing the right of self-insured ERISA plans to negotiate
discounts with hospitals, was superseded by the Supreme
Court's holding in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon28 that a
state law may "relate to" an employee benefit plan, even if
the law "'is not specifically designed to affect such plans or
the effect is only indirect.""29 Finally, the circuit court
agreed with the district court that the surcharges were not
saved from preemption by the exception for state insurance
law, holding that the surcharges did not regulate any
aspect of the insurer-insured relationship, but rather were
designed to encourage plans to purchase coverage through
the Blues. 3 '
121. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
122. Id. at 1007.
123. Id. at 1013-14.
124. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 718-19 (2d Cir.1993).
125. 506 U.S. 125, 129-30 (1992) ("Under § 514(a), ERISA pre-empts any
state law that refers to or has a connection with covered benefit plans (and that
does not fall within a § 514 (b) exception) even if the law is not specifically
designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect....") (citation and
internal quotation omitted).
126. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d at 718-19.
127. Id. at 719; Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1008 (1985).
128. 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
129. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d at 718 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand,
498 U.S. at 139).
130. Id. at 721-23.
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Several months earlier, the Third Circuit had reached
the opposite result in United Wire v. Morristown Memorial
Hospital.131 In United Wire, the Third Circuit held that a
New Jersey law that allowed hospitals to impose a
surcharge on hospital bills to cover uncompensated care
losses was not preempted, even though the law imposed an
economic burden on ERISA plans. In upholding the state
law, the Third Circuit noted that it was a law of general
and did not "relate to" an employee benefit
application
32
plan.

The Supreme Court granted review of the Second
Circuit's decision in Travelers to resolve this dispute
between the circuits. The Court's unanimous decision,
delivered by Justice Souter, reversed and remanded the
Second Circuit's decision, finding that the surcharges were
not preempted because they did not "relate to" employee
benefit plans. 3
After first restating the Court's presumption under the
Supremacy Clause that Congress generally does not intend
to supplant state law, Justice Souter reviewed the Court's
previous interpretations of the phrase "relates to."13
Finding the "connection with or reference to" language from
Shaw no more helpful than ERISA's original text in
defining the reach of preemption,'35 Justice Souter focused
on the objective of Congress in enacting ERISA § 514: to
eliminate the threat of conflicting and inconsistent state
to permit nationally uniform plan
regulation in order
3
administration.

1

In that context, the Court examined the surcharges.
The surcharges applied to all hospital bills, regardless of
whether paid by commercial insurers, employers,
individuals, other non-ERISA groups, such as churches or
HMOs. ERISA plans were not singled out or expressly
referred to.'

131. United Wire Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown
Mem'l Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at 1191-95.
133. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662.
134. Id. at 654-55.
135. Id. at 656.
136. Id. at 656-57.
137. Id. at 656.
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Unquestionably, one purpose of the surcharges was to
make coverage by the Blues more economically attractive.'38
But Justice Souter reasoned that the effect of the New York
law was distinguishable from the effect of the state laws in
the Court's previous decisions finding preemption, because
the indirect economic effect of imposing additional costs on
payers was different from state laws that mandated
benefits, affected the administration or operation of plans
or provided alternative remedies." 9 The Court noted:
An

indirect

economic

influence

...

does

not

bind

plan

administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself, commercial insurers and
HMO's may still offer more attractive packages than the Blues.
Nor does the indirect influence of the surcharges preclude uniform
administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate
benefit package if a plan vishes to provide one. It simply bears on
the costs of benefits and the relative costs of competing insurance
to provide them. It is an influence that can affect a plan's shopping
decisions, but it does not affect the fact that any plan140will shop for
the best deal it can get, surcharges or no surcharges.

In addition, the Court noted that state laws have long
affected hospital charges and costs, in part, through state
regulation of employment conditions and puality standards
which affect the cost and price of services. Finally, Justice
Souter observed that Congress could not have intended
ERISA to preempt state laws that affect hospital costs,
because shortly after it passed ERISA it enacted other laws
designed to encourage states to adopt laws that provided for
differences in rates to various classes of purchasers of
health care.
In Travelers, the Court was careful to note that by
holding that the New York law did not "relate to" an
employee benefit plan because it imposed only indirect
economic costs, the Court did not mean that only direct

138. Id. at 659.

139. Id. at 657-658.
140. Id. at 659-60.
141. Id. at 660.
142. Id. at 665-67; see, e.g., National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA), Pub. L. No. 93-641, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 2225
(1975), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, Title VII, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3743, 3799
(1986).
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regulation of ERISA plans was preempted. Instead, the
Court held open the possibility that:
[A] state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic
effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt
a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its
choice of insurers, and that such a state law might indeed be preempted under § 514.143

In addition, the Court limited its holding to the application
of the surcharges to commercial insurers and HMOs, noting
that because the issue of whether the surcharges were valid
as applied to self-insured ERISA plans had not been
addressed by the courts below, the factual record was
insufficient to decide that preemption issue.'
The Court's more recent decision in CaliforniaDivision
of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham
Construction, N.A., Inc.'45 reinforces several key aspects of
the analysis in Travelers. Dillingham involved a challenge
to California's prevailing wage law. The California law
permitted employers to pay a lower wage on public works
projects to apprentices who participated in a state-approved
apprenticeship program, but required employers to pay
prevailing wages to apprentices who were not participating
in such a program. 4 While Dillingham Construction was
the general contractor of a public works project, one of its
subcontractors paid a lower wage to apprentices who were
not participating in an approved program at the time the
work was performed. Although the progam
was later
47
approved, the approval was not retroactive.
Although the facts of the case were complicated, the
Court drew several analogies between Travelers and
Dillingham. Like the New York statute in Travelers, the
apprenticeship portion of the California prevailing wage
law in Dillingham did not bind ERISA plans to anything.
143. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
144. Id. at 652 n.4. In the remand proceeding subsequent to the Supreme
Court's decision in Travelers, the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held
that ERISA does not preempt the New York hospital surcharge statute with
respect to self-insured plans. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
1995).
145. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
146. Id. at 319-20.
147. Id. at 321-22.
148. Id. at 332.
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Apprenticeship programs were not required to be stateapproved. Public works contractors were not required to
hire apprentices. Even if these contractors did hire
apprentices, the apprentices were not required to be part of
an approved program.'49 However, to take advantage of the
exemption from payment of the prevailing wage (i.e., to pay
apprentices a lower wage), the California law required
contractors to use apprentices from state-approved
programs.' Thus, like the New York surcharges at issue in
Travelers, the California law "alter[ed] the incentives, but
d[id] not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans." 5 '
Both Travelers and Dillingham were unanimous
decisions. Clearly, those who hoped that Travelers' more
limited view of ERISA preemption was an aberration,
rather than a sign of shifting views on the high court, could
take little comfort in the Dillingham decision. And, in fact,
the Court reinforced the Travelers' principles in another
case decided in 1997, DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and
Clinical Services Fund.'52 This case involved a challenge to
a New York gross receipts tax, the Health Facility
Assessment (HFA).'5 ' The state legislature adopted the tax
in 1990 to raise funds necessary to avoid a shortfall in the
state medicaid program. The assessment was general in
application, falling on all hospitals operating in the state.'
The HFA defined the term "hospital" broadly and included
facilities that provided health care services under the
supervision of a physician or dentist. The law also applied
to diagnostic and treatment centers. 55
The NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund (the
"Fund") was a self-insured, jointly-trusteed multiemployer
health and welfare fund established by the New York
Shipping Association and the International Longshoremen's
Association. The Fund provided medical, dental and other
health services on an outpatient basis through three
medical centers that it owned and operated. 5 ' Two of them
were in New York and were licensed as diagnostic and
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 334.
520 U.S. 806 (1997).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-d (McKinney Supp. 1992).
See DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 815-16.
Id. at 809-810.
Id. at 810.
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treatment centers. These centers principally treated ILA
workers, retirees, and their families covered by the Fund.'57
Initially, the centers complied with the New York law
by paying the applicable 0.6% surcharge and filing the
required reports. After about a year, however, the centers
discontinued payments and ceased filing reports. The Fund
brought an action to obtain a refund of its HFA tax paid in
1991, and to enjoin the state from future assessments on
the grounds that HFA was preempted by ERISA. 8
However, the district court held that because the HFA was
a law of general application, not directed at ERISA plans
but applicable to all health facilities, and had an
insubstantial financial impact on plans, it was not
preempted.'59 The Second Circuit reversed and held the
HFA preempted. 6 ' The Supreme Court granted New York's
petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Second
Circuit, and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the Travelers decision.' The Second Circuit
reaffirmed its prior decision on remand,'62 and New York
again successfully sought review from the Supreme Court.
The Court reversed the Second Circuit. Applying the
Travelers principles, the Court held that the New York law
did not "relate to" ERISA plans.'63
The Supreme Court's final preemption case of 1997 was
Boggs v. Boggs."' Although state domestic relations law was
ultimately preempted in Boggs, the Court's analysis is
entirely consistent with the rationale used in Travelers,
Dillingham, and DeBuono to uphold state laws.'65 The
inescapable conclusion in the aftermath of Travelers and
the cases decided in 1997 is that the Court has abandoned
its pattern of broadly construing ERISA's "relates to" test so
157. Id.
158. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund v. Axelrod, No. 92CIV.2779
(JSM), 1993 WL 5146 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1993).
159. Id. at *4.
160. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund v. Axelrod, 27 F.3d 823 (2d Cir.
1994).
161. Chassin v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 514 U.S. 1094
(1995).
162. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund v. Axelrod, 74 F.3d 28 (2d Cir.
1996).
163. DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815
(1997).
164. 521 U.S. 833 (1997).
165. See infra text accompanying notes 55-61 for discussion of Boggs.
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as to invalidate nearly all state laws that were presented to

it.
Travelers changed the inquiry courts undertake when
they address preemption questions under ERISA. Before
Travelers, courts seldom focused on the impact of the
challenged state law on ERISA plans themselves because
the threshold for finding that a state law "relates to" an
ERISA plan was relatively low.'66 In fact, taken together,
the pre-Travelers precedents might easily lead one to
conclude that when courts approached preemption cases,
they generally began with a presumption of preemption
that the state (or the plaintiff seeking to enforce state law)
had to overcome by proving that the challenged state law
was not preempted. Clearly, Travelers and later cases have
changed that paradigm. Except in cases raising a clear
conflict with ERISA, state laws addressing areas of
traditional state regulation that do not single out ERISA
plans are likely presumed to be valid."' Moreover, the
Supreme Court has sent strong signals that in evaluating
questions of preemption, the necessary analysis involves
not only legal principles but factual determinations.

166. Of course, even if a court were to find that the challenged state law
"related to" an ERISA plan, that would not necessarily be dispositive. The court
would then determine whether the law was "saved" and if so, whether the
"deemer" clause would apply. This article does not discuss these cases in detail.
However, the most important savings clause cases decided by the Supreme
Court are Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(holding that a state law that mandated mental health benefits in insurance
contracts sold in-state was not preempted because the state law met the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's requirements for regulating "the business of
insurance"), PilotLife v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that Mississippi's
law of bad faith was not a law directed at the insurance industry exclusively
and therefore could not be considered to regulate it), and UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (holding that a state law can be saved as
a law that regulates insurance even if all three McCarran-Ferguson criteria are
not met). The leading "deemer" clause case is FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S.
52 (1990) (holding that a state anti-subrogation law was clearly a law
regulating insurance, but by precluding subrogation under any ERISA-covered
plan, the law was deeming the plan to be the insurer and thus was preempted).
167. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Diringer, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Co.
1999) (holding that ERISA does not preempt the Colorado Workers'
Compensation Act requiring employers to include the value of benefits provided
through an ERISA plan in calculating employee's average weekly wage because
the Act only has indirect economic impact on plans and thus does not "relate to"
ERISA plans).
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AFTER TRAVELERS: DEFINING NEW LIMITS OF STATE
ACTION

A. The Promise of Travelers
For many years courts construed plaintiffs' allegations
of medical malpractice and negligence against MCOs as
benefit claims cases so as to find these state law claims
completely preempted.'68 Recently, however, some courts
have instead looked more closely at the nature of the
allegations, not simply assuming that claims involving
allegations of malpractice are benefit claims in disguise.
These courts have distinguished between allegations of
negligence involving improper coverage decisions and
allegations that the care provided was substandard (i.e.,
traditional malpractice allegations). In simple terms, courts
have distinguished between cases involving denial of care
and cases challenging quality of care. In general, courts
agree that a claim that relates to the processing or
administration of a claim for reimbursement (or a precertification of treatment or reimbursement) is completely
preempted by ERISA. In a growing number of jurisdictions,
however, courts have held that claims against an MCO
relating to the delivery of medical services are neither
completely preempted as in Metropolitan Life v. Taylor 69
nor preempted under the express preemption provision in
ERISA § 514(a).

168. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992). In Corcoran, the plaintiffs
obstetrician sought pre-certification for a hospital stay during plaintiffs highrisk pregnancy. Id. at 1324. Under the employer's previous insured health plan,
she had been hospitalized in an earlier pregnancy for similar problems. Id. at
1323 n.1. In performing utilization review for the employer's self-funded
medical plan, the defendant determined that hospitalization was not necessary
and instead, authorized ten hours per day of home nursing care. Id. at 1324.
During a period when no nurse was on duty, the fetus went into distress and
died. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that ERISA
preempted the plaintiffs state law tort claim for wrongful death (allegedly
resulting from defendant's erroneous medical decision). Although the defendant
made medical decisions and gave medical advice, the court determined that it
did so in the context of determining the availability of benefits under an ERISA
plan and therefore, its decision to deny hospitalization was a benefit decision.
Id. at 1331. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs malpractice claims
related to the plan and were completely preempted by ERISA. Id.
169. 481 U.S. 58 (1987); see supra Part ll.E.2. for discussion of Taylor.
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B. The CurrentFramework:Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare
There is an apparent split of authority in the courts
about whether traditional medical malpractice claims may
be filed against an MCO. The cases involve a variety of
agency theories, although the most successful theory
involves claims that an MCO is vicariously liable for the
actions of its providers. Only a handful of circuit courts
have addressed this issue, but the majority have permitted
state malpractice actions to go forward. In 1995, three
circuit courts (the Third, Seventh, and Tenth) addressed the
issue of whether ERISA preempts claims against MCOs
that are based on allegations that the MCO is vicariously
liable for negligently provided medical services, holding
that state causes of action for negligent delivery of care are
not completely preempted by ERISA because challenging
the quality of care received is not the same as challenging a
benefit denial. In 1999, the Eighth Circuit rejected the
vicarious liability theory, holding that determining a course
of treatment for a plan participant is simply an aspect of
determining benefit coverage. These decisions are described
below.
The seminal vicarious liability case is Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. 7 ' The case is significant not only for the
standards the court sets out, but also because it marked the
first time that the Department of Labor, as amicus curie,
weighed in to support the argument that state law medical
malpractice claims were not preempted. 7 ' This case was
actually a consolidation of two cases filed in state courts,
alleging medical malpractice against U.S. Healthcare. The
first involves care provided to Darryl Dukes; the second
involves care provided to Linda Visconti while she was
pregnant with Serena Visconti.
Mr. Dukes had been suffering from a variety of medical
problems. After he had surgery for an ear ailment, his
treating physician ordered some additional blood tests. For
unexplained reasons, the hospital laboratory refused to
perform the tests.'72 The next day, Mr. Dukes sought
170. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995).
171. See Preemption: Labor Department Opposes View that ERISA Covers
Health Liability, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 940 (Apr. 14, 1997) ("The Labor
Department actively joined the fray.., by filing an amicus curiae brief with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Dukes v. U.S. HealthcareInc.").
172. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352.
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treatment for another ailment at a different facility; this
treating physician ordered blood tests that were performed.
However, Mr. Dukes's condition continued to deteriorate
and he died shortly thereafter. All of the treatment Mr.
Dukes sought was from U.S. Healthcare's HMOs, network
facilities, and their providers." 3
After his death, Mr. Dukes's wife brought suit in state
court against U.S. Healthcare and a number of entities in
the network (including the hospital, the second facility, and
the two doctors), seeking damages under various state law
theories for injuries arising from the medical malpractice of
the HMOs' hospitals and medical providers." 4 The HMO
removed the case to federal court, arguing that removal was
proper because treatment had been provided as a benefit
under an ERISA plan. Plaintiffs claims, the HMO argued,
were completely preempted under Taylor and expressly
preempted by § 514(a)'7
The district court agreed and
76
dismissed the claims.
The Viscontis made similar allegations of malpractice.
During the third trimester of her pregnancy, Linda Visconti
developed symptoms typical of preeclampsia. The condition
was not diagnosed or treated and, as a result, Serena
Visconti was stillborn.'7 1 Mrs. Visconti was treated by a
network obstetrician at an HMO owned by U.S. Healthcare.
The Viscontis sued both U.S. Healthcare and Linda
Visconti's obstetrician under state law, alleging that the
provider's negligence caused Serena's death. They also
claimed that U.S. Healthcare was vicariously liable for the
doctor's malpractice under various ostensible and actual
agency theories. They also sued under a direct negligence
theory, alleging that U.S. Healthcare was negligent both in
selecting the doctor for the8 network and in overseeing the
performance of its doctors.'
The HMO removed the case to federal court, arguing
that the Viscontis' claims were completely preempted by
ERISA. The district court agreed, dismissing the Viscontis'
appeal of the removal and granting the HMO's motion to
173.
174.
175.
176.
1994).
177.
178.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 352-53.
Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D. Pa.
See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353.
Id.
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dismiss.179 The Dukes and Visconti cases were consolidated
on appeal.
The Third Circuit first considered the procedural
question of whether it was proper to remove the cases to
federal court.18 To resolve this question, the court had to
decide whether the case was one that arose under federal
law. If it did, the case was removable. If it did not, the case
could only be heard in state court because federal courts
only have the jurisdiction to hear cases "arising under"
federal law. The determination of whether a case arises
under federal law is made by carefully examining the
plaintiffs complaint. The Third Circuit described the
procedure as follows:
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a cause of action "arises
under" federal law, and removal is proper, only if a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded
complaint.... A federal defense [such as preemption] to a
plaintiffs state law cause of action ordinarily does not appear on
the face of the well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, usually is
insufficient to warrant removal to Federal court....
The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule-the "complete pre-emption" exceptionunder which "Congress may so completely preempt a particular
area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is
necessarily federal in character."...

The Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended the
complete-preemption doctrine to apply to state law causes of action
which fit within the scope of ERISA's civil-enforcement
provisions. 8

To determine whether the plaintiffs' claims fell within
ERISA's enforcement structure and were therefore
completely preempted, the Third Circuit examined the
nature of the allegations. Finding that the plaintiffs' claims
involved the quality of care they received, rather than
claims to recover benefits due under the plan, the court
179. Visconti ex rel. Visconti v. U.S. Healthcare, 857 F. Supp. 1097, 1105
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
180. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353.
181. Id. at 353-54 (citations omitted) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)).
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concluded that removal was improper because the cause of
action was not completely preempted by ERISA.8 ' The
Third Circuit then remanded the cases to district court with
instructions to send them back to state court for trial on the
issue of vicarious liability of the MCO for the actions of its
providers." 3 Interestingly, in sending the cases back to state
court, the Third Circuit assumed for the sake of its
procedural instruction to the district court that the HMO
was a plan and ignored the threshold question integral to
an ERISA § 514 preemption analysis: whether the HMO
itself was an ERISA plan entitled to claim preemption (if
not, the state law malpractice claims would not be
preempted because they did not relate to an ERISA plan).
In 1999, the Third Circuit revisited and expanded upon
the principles it articulated in Dukes when it decided In re
U.S. Healthcare, Inc."8 In this case, the plaintiffs (the
Baumans) sued in New Jersey state court for damages
arising from the death of their newborn daughter. Mrs.
Bauman gave birth to her daughter and, in accordance with
the pre-certification provided by the HMO prior to her
admittance, both mother and child were discharged from
the hospital after twenty-four hours. 85 The day after the
baby was discharged (two days after she was born), the
baby became ill. The Baumans made numerous calls to the
pediatrician, but were never advised to bring the baby back
to the hospital. At the same time, they contacted the HIMO
and requested an in-home visit by a pediatric nurse, a
service that was covered under the plan's "L'il Appleseed
Program." The nursing visit was not provided. Thus, a strep
infection that the baby had contracted in the hospital was
undiagnosed and untreated. The infant
rapidly developed
86
meningitis, and died that same day.
The Baumans alleged that U.S. Healthcare's policy
required participating physicians to discharge mothers and
newborns after twenty-four hours,'87 and discouraged them
from readmitting infants to the hospital when health
182. Id. at 356-57.
183. Id. at 361.
184. 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999). This case is also referred to as Bauman v.
U.S. Healthcare, as in the district court. See Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 1
F. Supp. 2d 420 (D.N.J. 1998).
185. In re U.S. Healthcare,193 F.3d at 156.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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problems arose after discharge.' The Baumans sued the
pediatrician responsible for their daughter's care, the
hospital where the child was born, and the HMO (a
subsidiary of U.S. Healthcare) to which the Baumans
belonged. The complaint alleged various tort violations
(including negligence for not providing medically
appropriate care and for failure to diagnose and treat the
infection) against all defendants and direct negligence and
vicarious liability against the hospital and the HMO." 9
The defendants removed the case to federal court,
alleging complete preemption under ERISA. In the district
court, the defendants moved for dismissal or, alternatively,
for summary judgment. The plaintiffs moved to remand,
arguing that their claims could not be completely
preempted, because they did not fall within any of ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions and therefore there could be no
basis for federal jurisdiction. However, the district court
disagreed, holding that the count challenging the failure of
the HMO to provide a nurse's visit was completely
preempted under ERISA § 502, as well as expressly
preempted under ERISA § 514(a). 90 The court therefore
dismissed that count. But the other five counts were
remanded to state court for further examination. 9' U.S.
Healthcare appealed the district court's order and filed a
mandamus motion. The Baumans appealed the dismissal of
the single count and the refusal of the court to remand it to
state court.
The district court amended its original order to state
that the dismissal of the single count was with respect to
U.S. Healthcare only, and affirmed its remand of the other
counts. U.S. Healthcare then appealed and filed a writ of
mandamus, which was referred by the Third Circuit to a
panel to rule on the merits of the allegations. A complicated
series of motions by the defendants and cross-motions by
the Baumans were filed.
The issue before the Third Circuit was a procedural
one: whether the plaintiffs claims arose under ERISA as
benefit claims and were therefore completely preempted by
188. Id. at 157.
189. See id. at 155-57.
190. See id. at 156.
191. See id. at 157; Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 420
(D.N.J. 1998), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded by, 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1242 (2000).
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ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) or whether they were state negligence
and malpractice claims outside the scope of ERISA. 92 In
essence, however, the circuit court focused on the role U.S.
Healthcare was playing when it performed the acts that
caused the death of the infant: was it the processor of a
claim for benefits or the overseer of a system for delivering
medical care? 9
As in Dukes, the Third Circuit examined the facts of the
case and concluded that the Baumans were not complaining
about a benefit denial, but rather that the behavior of the
defendants in establishing and implementing the policies
regarding discharge and readmission was negligent and
inconsistent with quality health care.' The circuit court
concluded that the Baumans' claims involved the quality of
medical decisionmaking and medical care, not coverage
and therefore were not completely preempted by ERISA. 9'
For this reason, the Third Circuit directed that the claims
be remanded to state court.196
97 the
Similarly, in Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage,1
Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly
remanded state law malpractice and vicarious liability
claims brought against a physician and an HMO because
they were not preempted by ERISA. 19' The action had
originally been filed in state court. The defendants removed
it to federal court, but the district court concluded that only
one of the plaintiffs three claims was preempted. It
dismissed that claim and remanded the other two.199 The
defendants then filed a writ of mandamus to force the
district court to rescind the remand. The Tenth Circuit
denied the mandamus request, finding that the district
court correctly concluded that the claims were saved from
preemption under ERISA § 514 because they did not relate
to an ERISA plan."0 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the
district court that the negligence claim against the
physician could be resolved without reference to the plan.0 '
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

In re U.S. Healthcare,193 F.3d at 161.
See id. at 162.
Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 163.
See id. at 163-64.
59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 155.
Id. at 152.
See id. at 154.
Id.
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In addition, the court said that the question whether an
agency relationship existed between the doctor and the
HMO did not involve either plan benefits or
administration."2 Therefore, neither of these claims was
sufficiently related to a plan so as to be preempted by
ERISA § 514.203
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Rice v. Panchal0 4
was the same as the Tenth Circuit's in Pacificare. David
Rice filed claims alleging medical malpractice against two
providers and vicarious liability for malpractice against the
plan administrator (Prudential).0 5 The claim against
Prudential was based on a respondeat superior theory.0 6
Prudential removed to federal court, arguing that ERISA
completely preempted Mr. Rice's claims. The district court
then dismissed Mr. Rice's action against Prudential because
there was no remedy under ERISA for malpractice. On
appeal, Rice argued that the case was improperly removed
because his claims were not completely preempted. The
Secretary of Labor, as amicus curie, agreed.0 7 The Seventh
Circuit, like the Third Circuit in Dukes, discussed the
differences between "complete preemption" under ERISA §
502(a) and "preemption" as a defense under ERISA §
514(a).0" Because Mr. Rice's malpractice claims did not rest
on the terms of the plan and could be resolved without
interpreting the plan, the court held they were not
completely preempted by ERISA. Therefore, removal was
improper and the case was remanded to state court to
resolve the issue of whether there was an agency
relationship between the doctor and Prudential, acting as
plan administrator. 9
A contrary result was reached by the Eighth Circuit in
Hull v. Fallon,210 where the court refused to recognize a

cause of action against an MCO for medical malpractice.21'

202. Id. at 155.
203. Id.
204. 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995), amended by, reh'g denied en banc, sub
nom. Rice v. Kanu, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31419 (7th Cir. 1995).
205. Rice, 65 F.3d 638.
206. Id. at 639.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 644-45.
209. Id. at 646.
210. 188 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 1999), rehg en banc denied, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25188 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1189 (2000).
211. Although in this respect Hull appears to conflict with Dukes, Burrage,
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Mr. Hull, a participant in a health insurance plan
issued by Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., visited his
primary care physician claiming shortness of breath, chest
pain, and arm pain. His physician twice requested
authorization to give Mr. Hull a stress test, but both
requests were denied by Dr. Fallon (the administrator of
Prudential's ERISA plan), although Dr. Fallon did
authorize a treadmill stress test.2 12 Unfortunately, Mr. Hull
suffered a heart attack and additional serious complications
allegedly as a result of the delay in diagnosis and treatment
of his heart condition.
Mr. Hull brought a medical malpractice action in state
court against both Dr. Fallon, the medical doctor who
administered the insured health plan, and the health
insurance issuer itself, claiming that the issuer was
vicariously liable for the medical malpractice of Dr.
Fallon.21 After the case was removed to federal court, the
district court held that the state claims were completely
preempted and dismissed the action, concluding that Dr.
Fallon was acting as a plan administrator, rather than as a
treating
214 physician, in denying the services sought by Mr.
Hull.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that the state malpractice claim against the HMO and Dr.
Fallon were preempted by ERISA. Even though Mr. Hull
argued that his was a quality of care case involving the
negligent diagnosis and treatment of his illness, the
defendants were successful in convincing both the district
and circuit courts that Dr. Fallon was operating as the plan

and Rice, the analysis used by the Eighth Circuit in reaching its conclusion that
a medical malpractice action did not lie is actually consistent with those cases,
because the Hull court concluded that the complaint involved a benefit denial
decision (i.e., denial of a thallium stress test) made by the plan's administrator,
Dr. Fallon, not a treatment decision. Id. at 942. Thus, the Eighth Circuit never
reached the question of whether, had a treatment decision been involved, the
MCO could be held vicariously liable for medical negligence. Arguably the case
that could be viewed as conflicting with Hull is In re U.S. Healthcare,where the
Third Circuit concluded that the HMO's failure to provide an in-home visit by a
pediatric nurse as part of the plan's Li'l Appleseed program was a question of
adequacy of care, not denial of benefits. In re U.S. Healthcare,193 F.3d 151, 164
(3d Cir. 1999).
212. 188 F.3d at 941.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 941-42.
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administrator making a coverage decision, rather than a
physician making a medical decision:
The district court found that Dr. Fallon... denied the thallium
test as part of a determination of benefits owed by the Plan. We
agree with the district court's reasoning and conclude that Hull's
claims... are preempted by ERISA. In short, although Hull's
characterization of his claims sound in medical malpractice, the
essence of his claim rests on the denial of benefits. As a Plan
participant, he could have brought an action under section 502(a).
Because his claims relate to the administration of benefits, they
fall squarely within the cope of section 502(a). Therefore, Hull's
claims are completely preempted by ERISA. Plan administrators
necessarily exercise medical judgment in determining benefits due
under the plan. To find that Hull's claims are not preempted would
be to expose plan administrators to varying state causes of actions
for claims within the scope of section 502(a). This "would pose an
obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress."215

Although many courts have applied the coveragetreatment distinction developed in Dukes, Rice, and
Burrage and elaborated in Bauman, the results have not
always been consistent.2 16 Nonetheless, most courts
215. Id. at 943 (emphasis added) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 52 (1987)).
216. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that
negligent misrepresentation claims against physicians are not preempted);
Maio v. Aetna Inc., 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that health care
provider's failure to reveal financial incentive arrangement it had with
physicians did not address the quality of health care services); Corporate
Health Ins., Inc., v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
a state statute requiring HMOs and other health insurers to establish a system
of independent external review for disputed claims and establish other
administrative mechanisms effectively created an alternate enforcement

mechanism to ERISA's benefit claims procedures and was thus preempted);
Giles v. Nylcare, 172 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that claims for vicarious

liability and negligence against health care provider were properly remanded to
state court); Danca v. Private Healthcare Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding that negligent decision making and consultation practices were
deemed part of the administrative process used to assess claim for benefit
payments and therefore were preempted); Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 12675 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that an action seeking to enjoin
a health care provider from changing its method of compensation to physicians
is not a violation of ERISA; the claim is essentially alleging a reduction in
quality of care that is properly brought in state court); Jass v. Prudential

Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that claims
against nurse for her refusal to authorize non-medically necessary

rehabilitation treatment are really a claim for benefits preempted by ERISA);

Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Lewis, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2595 (10th Cir.
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generally have distinguished claims about the quality of
medical care from claims about the quantity of care, that is,
claims asserting that benefits were wrongfully withheld.
"Quality" claims arise from an HMO's actions as a health
care provider-that is, as an arranger or provider of
medical treatment, either directly or through contracts with
hospitals, doctors, or nurses. They are not actionable under
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and do not arise under federal law.
Accordingly, a plaintiff may pursue such claims under state
law, even though the relevant state law may ultimately be
preempted by ERISA § 514.217 "Quantity" claims challenging
plan administration decisions, even when the decisions
involve the exercise of medical judgment, are considered
actionable under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and, thus, are
completely preempted."'8

1996) (holding that a claim alleging that the health care plan and the insurance
company were liable under a vicarious or ostensible agency theory for the
alleged negligence of several physicians who failed to detect a malignant lesion
was properly brought in state court); Rivers v. Health Options Connect, Inc., 96
F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that wrongful death action brought
against health care provider was properly brought in state court); Stewart v.
Berry Health Family Ctr., 105 F. Supp. 2d 807 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that a
claim alleging the existence of financial incentives that discourage physicians
from providing medically appropriate treatment does not constitute a claim
under § 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA and is therefore not preempted); Garrison v.
Northeast Ga. Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (finding that
plaintiffs' state law addressing unauthorized practice of medicine and
negligence claims constituted denial of a benefits claims under an ERISA plan;
thus the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule
applied, and removal was proper); Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of
the Mid-Atlantic States, 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that a claim
for negligently establishing an incentive program which induced the plaintiffs
physicians not to order additional testing constituted a claim for benefits);
Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that ERISA does not
preempt a state law claim that an HMO was vicariously liable for its network
physicians' alleged malpractice in their treatment of an enrollee and therefore the
IMO defendants improperly removed the case to federal court on preemption
grounds); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (granting
plaintiffs' motion to remand because there was no preemption in suit against
two doctors, their medical groups, and an HMO for the physicians'
misdiagnosing and mistreating the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs
"W[m]aintain[ed] that their complaint [was] based on the quality of medical care
provided by the defendants [and was] unrelated to their right to benefits").
217. See, e.g., Stewart v. Berry Family Health Ctr., 105 F. Supp. 2d 807, 813
(S.D. Ohio 2000).
218. See, e.g., Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d at 943; see also Corcoran v. United
Healthcare Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331-34 (5th Cir. 1992).
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C. Pegram v. Herdrich-Beyond Dukes?
Although the lower courts have developed a consensus
of sorts concerning the coverage-treatment distinction, this
analytical framework is not without its problems. Most
importantly, coverage and treatment issues are often so
intertwined that it seems arbitrary or subjective to classify
a decision as either a choice about coverage (quantity) or a
choice about treatment (qguality). In Nascimento v. Harvard
Community Health Plan, 9 the court described the dilemma
as follows:
[It may be ... that HCHP physicians who provided plaintiff with
treatment functioned both as health care providers and as
utilization review administrators.... Even if HCHP physicians
actually functioned, at least in part, as plan administrators,
however, I am of the opinion that the result would not change.
When a physician makes a decision both as a plan administrator
and as a health care provider, only a metaphysician can separate
the components of the treatment decision rooted in plan
considerations from those rooted in pure medical judgments,
particularlyo when the plan covers all medically necessary
treatment.20

In Pegram v. Herdrich,"' the Supreme Court abruptly
called into question the developing consensus concerning
the coverage-treatment distinction and offered a new and
perhaps clearer framework for distinguishing between
decisions that involve the core of a health plan's operations
and decisions that are medically based. Pegram itself did
not involve ERISA preemption at all. The issue before the
Court was quite different: Is it a breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA for an HMO to use financial incentives to
ration care?22 2 Not surprisingly, the Court said no. In the
process of answering that simple question, however, the
Court broke significant new ground as well as reaffirmed
some old principles and clarified some current ambiguities.
Pegram involved claims against the Carle Clinic
Association, an HMO that was owned by the doctors who
provided treatment and made eligibility decisions. Carle
provided financial incentives that directly linked year-end
219.
220.
221.
222.

1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 166 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1997).
Id. at *26 n.12.
530 U.S. 211 (2000).
See id. at 214.
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profit distributions to the physician-owners' ability to limit
care, whether through limiting the cost of treatment or
through claims determinations based in part on medical
judgment. The case arose out of treatment provided to
Cynthia Herdrich by Dr. Lori Pegram, one of the physicianowners of Carle.22 Dr. Pegram found a large, inflamed mass
in Mrs. Herdrich's abdomen and concluded that it was an
inflamed appendix. Dr. Pegram ordered a diagnostic
ultrasound for Mrs. Herdrich, with the procedure to take
place eight days later in a Carle-owned facility more than
fifty miles away, rather than at a local hospital."4 In the
interim, Mrs. Herdrich's appendix ruptured.
Mrs. Herdrich brought medical malpractice and fraud
claims in state court against Dr. Pegram and Carle Clinic.
Although Mrs. Herdrich's malpractice claim against Dr.
Pegram was successful, Carle and Pegram removed the
fraud claims to federal court. The district court dismissed
the fraud claims on the basis of ERISA preemption. Mrs.
Herdrich amended her complaint and alleged that the
financial incentives Carle gave to its physicians breached
fiduciary duties under ERISA.225 The district court
dismissed Mrs. Herdrich's claim after concluding "that
Carle was 'not involved [in these events] as' an ERISA
'
fiduciary."226
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that Carle was acting as a fiduciary when its
physicians made treatment decisions and that the decisions
themselves were fiduciary acts.227
The Supreme Court perceived Pegram as a frontal
assault on the core principle of managed care.228 In the
traditional fee-for-service
system, there
are clear
distinctions between treatment and payment decisions.
Managed care is a system of risk and rewards that is
designed to balance the financial risks of assuming
responsibility for the care of a patient with the costs
associated with providing essential and efficient treatment
when the patient needs it. Thus, managed care necessarily
blurs the lines between treatment and payment decisions.
223. Id. at 215.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 216.
226. Id. at 217.
227. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530
U.S. 211 (2000).
228. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. at 220-21.
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Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Souter in Pegram
used the provocative term "rationing" to describe what an
MCO does when it pays doctors more if they reduce
utilization of medical care. 9 He stated candidly that "[n]o
HMO could survive without some incentive connecting
physician reward with treatment rationing."23" Through its
encouragement of HMOs, Congress had long sanctioned
such rationing. The notion of applying ERISA's strict
fiduciary standards to such rationing decisions was
impossible to fathom. If fiduciary standards were applied,
any decision based on cost rather than the best interests of
the participants and beneficiaries would be a violation of
ERISA.231 The Court concluded that there was no reason to
23 2
suppose that Congress had intended such a result.
Accordingly, rationing decisions could not be subject to
ERISA's fiduciary rules."s
The next portion of the decision was devoted to an
interesting but not particularly groundbreaking discussion
of several well-established but often overlooked ERISA
principles. The Court concluded that an HMO is not an
ERISA plan, but rather a service provider for ERISA
plans." 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court started with
the basics: the definition of a "plan" as the term is used in
ERISA. Justice Souter concluded that a "plan" is a scheme
decided on in advance: "a set of rules that define the
23 5 rights
of a beneficiary and provide for their enforcement."
[But] when employers contract with an HMO to provide benefits to
employees subject to ERISA, the provisions of documents that set
up the HMO are not, as such, the ERISA plan, but the agreement
between an HMO and an employer who pays the premiums may,
as here, provide elements of a plan by setting out rules under
which beneficiaries will be entitled to care.

229. Id. at 220-21.
230. Id. at 220.
231. Id. at 222.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 222.
234. See id. at 223. For a detailed discussion of this principle, see
Washington Physicians'Servs. Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1998).
See also American Drug Stores Inc., v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Inc., 973
F. Supp. 60 (D. Mass. 1997).
235. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223.
236. Id.
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This is a key distinction that has often been disregarded by
the courts.
Two other well-established principles that the Court
reiterated on the way to its conclusion that Carle was not
engaged in fiduciary conduct when it created financial
incentives for providers were (1) that fiduciary status must
be determined under a functional test, and (2) that, unlike
at common law where trustees can wear only one hat,
under ERISA, trustees can wear more than one, although
only one at a time.238 Perhaps the most significant
reaffirmation of prior Supreme Court principles was the
Court's lengthy discussion of how the decision of the HMO
to include financial incentives for its doctors is analogous to
a plan sponsor's decision about the content or design of a
plan. When a plan sponsor decides to include financial
incentives for providers in its health care plan, it acts as a
settlor, rather than as a fiduciary.239 Justice Souter stated
that the same principle applies to an HMO.24° An HMO may
be a fiduciary when it performs plan administration
functions for an ERISA-covered group health plan, but
when it carries out its own business operations, it is not
subject to ERISA's fiduciary standards any more than an

237. In Dukes, for example, the Third Circuit never addressed this question,
although it noted that the U.S. Department of Labor, as amicus curie, had
argued strenuously that the HMO was not the ERISA plan. See 57 F.3d 350,
356 (3d Cir. 1995). For purposes of its preemption analysis, the court simply
assumed that U.S. Healthcare was a fiduciary performing acts of plan
administration with respect to an ERISA plan, concluding that it was
unnecessary to resolve the issue. See id. That assessment is clearly correct. The
Third Circuit had already concluded that Mr. Dukes's claim was not completely
preempted; the question of whether or not the HMO is an ERISA plan (or is
performing acts of plan administration) is most relevant to determining
whether the state law is preempted under ERISA § 514, the precise issue before
the state court on remand. Determining which entity is the ERISA plan is
critical to determining whether a state law is preempted under ERISA § 514.
ERISA § 514(a) only protects ERISA plans from state regulation; ERISA does
not insulate vendors or service providers to ERISA plans from state regulation
as they otherwise carry out their own business activities simply because of their
connection to ERISA plans. Thus, distinguishing between acts of plan
administration and acts that relate to the internal business decisions of the
HMO or MCO is quite important in evaluating the merits of an ERISA
preemption defense to a state law claim.
238. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225.
239. Id. at 226-27.
240. Id.
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employer is when the employer carries out settlor
functions.241
Moreover, even though the Carle Clinic was a fiduciary
with respect to Mrs. Herdrich's plan because it
administered the plan, the decision to include financial
incentives in Carle's physician compensation structure
preceded Carle's contract with State Farm. On that ground
alone, the Court could have concluded that adoption of the
financial incentives was not a fiduciary act with respect to
Mrs. Herdrich's plan.242
As previously noted, the Court believed that applying
ERISA's fiduciary standards to treatment decisions would
undermine the very foundation of managed care. 243 At the
same time, however, the Court struggled to understand the
precise nature of the issue it confronted in Pegram. Justice
Souter acknowledged that it was difficult to determine
exactly which of the acts Mrs. Herdrich was alleging
constituted a fiduciary breach.2" Having concluded that the
decision to include financial incentives for providers in its
compensation structure could not be a fiduciary act on the
part of Carle, the Court turned to the question of whether,
in the course of administering the plan, certain actions of
the physician/owners acting on behalf of the HMO were
fiduciary in nature and, if so, whether these actions were
improperly influenced by the presence of the bonus pool
arrangement.
In analyzing this question, Justice Souter focused on
two types of administrative acts that the physician/owners
undertook:
What we will call pure "eligibility decisions" turn on the plan's
coverage of a particular condition or medical procedure for its
treatment. "Treatment decisions," by contrast, are the choices
about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient's
condition: given a patient's constellation
of symptoms, what is the
245
appropriate medical response?

241. See id. at 226-27.
242. See id. at 227 n.7.
243. See id. at 235 ("The Court of Appeals did not purport to entertain quite
the broadside attack that Herdrich's ERISA claim... entails ...
244. Id. at 227-28.
245. Id. at 228.

1262

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Noting that "[t]hese decisions are often practically
inextricable ,246 Justice Souter explained that the problem
arises for a variety of reasons:
This is so not merely because, under a scheme like Carle's,
treatment and eligibility decisions are made by the same person,
the treating physician. It is so because a great many and possibly
most coverage questions are not simple yes-or-no questions, like
whether appendicitis is a covered condition (when there is no
dispute that the patient has appendicitis), or whether acupuncture
is a covered procedure for pain relief (when the claim of pain is
unchallenged). The more common coverage question is the whenand-how question. Although coverage for many conditions will be
clear and various treatment options will be indisputably
compensable, physicians must still decide what to do in particular
cases.

For example, the Court noted that the government's
amicus brief provides an example of an HMO's refusal to
pay for emergency care because the HMO concluded that,
under the circumstances, no emergency existed.248 In that
situation, said Justice Souter, "these eligibility decisions
cannot be untangled from physicians' judgments about
reasonable medical treatment."2 9 The decisions involved in
Mrs. Herdrich's treatment, the Court concluded, were
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions. 211 Still struggling
to define the parameters of Mrs. Herdrich's fiduciary breach
claims, however, the Court concluded that she did not mean
to allege a breach of fiduciary duty regarding "pure
eligibility determinations"-those that can be made without
reference to the individual patient's condition (e.g., does the
plan cover an undisputed case of appendicitis) or those
administrative decisions not involving medical judgment. 1
Turning once again to an examination of congressional
intent, Justice Souter stated that Congress could not have
intended that an HMO should be treated as a fiduciary "to
the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting
246. Id.
247. Id.

248. Id. at 229.
249. Id.
250. See id. ("The eligibility decision and the treatment decision were
inextricably mixed, as they are in countless medical administrative decisions
every day.").
251. Id. at 230.
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through its physicians"252 because these decisions bear little
resemblance to the traditional fiduciary functions
undertaken by plan trustees regarding plan assets.253 In
contrast to the typical financial decisions made by pension
plan trustees involved in plan administration, the types of
decisions made by HMOs involve whether or not to provide
medical care-a decision that is not fundamentally
financial in nature.254
Thus the Court concluded that neither pure treatment
decisions, nor mixed treatment and eligibility decisions
made by physicians, are acts of plan administration, and,
therefore, ERISA's fiduciary rules do not apply to these
decisions. Only "pure eligibility decisions" will be
considered acts of plan administration under ERISA.
Since Pegram carefully limited acts of plan
administration undertaken by HMOs to pure eligibility
decisions, most typical HMO activities appear to be beyond
the reach of ERISA fiduciary responsibility rules. Although
HMOs and their treating physicians exercise broad
discretion regarding the provision of medical services to
participants in ERISA plans, these types of decisions are
likely to fall within the non-fiduciary realm and thus
subject to accountability under state law, not ERISA. Two
possible exceptions are cases involving misrepresentations
and disclosure. On this latter point, in dicta, the Court left
the door open to the possibility that even though the
existence of financial incentives for HMO physicians was
not a fiduciary violation under ERISA, failure to disclose
them by the HMO might be."'
In the final paragraphs of the decision, the Court
engaged in a curious discussion of ERISA preemption. The
Court assumed that providing a fiduciary action under
ERISA for mixed eligibility decisions would be of little value
to participants, since that would simply federalize under
ERISA the type of action already available under state

252. Id. at 231.
253. Id. at 231-32.
254. See id. at 231-37.
255. Id. at 227-28 n.8. ("Although we are not presented with the issue here,
it could be argued that Carle is a fiduciary insofar as it has discretionary
authority to administer the plan, and so is obligated to disclose characteristics
of the plan and of those who provide services to the plan, if that information
affects beneficiaries' material interests.").

1264

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

malpractice laws.256 In its discussion, the Court assumes the
validity of such state laws: "It is true that in States that do
not allow malpractice actions against HMOs the fiduciary
claim would offer a plaintiff a further defendant to be sued
for direct liability, and in some cases the HMO might have
a deeper pocket than the physician."257
This statement should give comfort to the growina
number of states that have enacted HMO liability laws,2'
since the Court's observation would likely be meaningless
unless it assumed that those laws were valid.
Although Pegram was about the scope of ERISA's
fiduciary duties, considerable speculation has been raised
about whether its rationale will be applied to future ERISA
preemption cases involving participants' benefit claims.
This speculation has been fueled by some puzzling aspects
of the Pegram decision itself. In a footnote in the middle of
its discussion of mixed eligibility decisions, the Court noted
the existence of a separate cause of action under ERISA for
suits for benefits and then ducked the question of whether
the same conclusion about the applicability of state law to
mixed eligibility decisions would be drawn if the suit had
involved claims for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B)"' After
raising the issue, the Court simply remarked that it had no
reason to discuss this question."
In its preemption discussion at the end of the opinion,
the Court referred to Travelers and emphasized the
presumption against preemption of state medical regulation
unless there is a clear manifestation of Congress's intent to
256. See id. at 235.
257. Id. at 235-36.
258. As of summer 2001, the list included nine states: Arizona, California,
Georgia, Maine, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington and West Virginia.
See 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws 37 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-3151 to 3155); 1999 Cal. Stat. 536 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428); 1999 Ga. Laws
350 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1-48 to -49); 1999 Me. Laws 742 (codified
at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4313); 2001 N.J. Laws 187 (to be codified at
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-30 to -36); 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws 163 (codified at
OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 6591-6595); 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 163 (codified at TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003); 2000 Wash. Laws 5 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.43.500 et seq.); 2001 W. Va. Acts 166 (to be codified at
W. VA. CODE §§ 33-25C-1 to -11); see also PATRICIA BUTLER, THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MANAGED CARE

ORGANIZATION

LIABILITY LAWS:

CURRENT

STATUS AND EXPERIENCE (2001),

availableat http://www.kff.org/content(2001/3155.
259. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229 n.9.
260. Id.
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" ' In the footnote described above, the Court
preempt.26
mysteriously cross-referenced the discussion of preemption
at the end of its opinion.262 Yet the Court neither discussed
nor alluded to the doctrines of conflict preemption or
complete preemption. These doctrines have consistently
been used by the lower courts to preempt state law in
actions challenging coverage decisions.

D. Post-PegramCases
Confusing the picture further, one week after it decided
Pegram, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
263 In addition, also on
Bauman case (In re U.S. Healthcare).
the same day, the Court granted certiorariand vacated the
decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Pappasv.
and then remanded Pappas for further
Asbe 2'"
consideration in light of Pegram.
In Pappas I, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that claims against an HMO based on a delay in approving
the transport of a patient with a back injury that led to his
paralysis were not preempted under ERISA § 514 because
they did not "relate to" a plan.265 The court analyzed the
challenged conduct as a malpractice claim because the
HMO's decision concerned the interrelated questions of
coverage and safe medical practice. The court concluded
that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws
regarding medical care.266
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania again held in Pappas II that the
state claims were not preempted by ERISA.26 ' The court
first described two guiding principles that the Supreme
Court had articulated in Pegram: (1) HMO physicians
occupy dual roles-plan administrators when they make
coverage decisions and health care providers when they
decide what medical treatment the participant will receive;
261. See id. at 236-37.
262. Id. at 229 n.9.
263. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub
nom. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Bauman, 530 U.S. 1242 (2000).
264. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), vacated and remanded by U.S. Healthcare
Sys. of Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000).
265. 724 A.2d at 893 (Pappas1).
266. Id. (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
267. Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (PappasII).
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and (2) there are three types of decisions an HMO physician
may make: "pure eligibility decisions," "treatment
decisions,"
and "mixed eligibility and
treatment
decisions."2 "8
Rejecting the HMO's argument that the decision not to
permit the referral of Mr. Pappas to a non-network hospital
"constituted a quintessential 'coverage' determination," the
court concluded that U.S. Healthcare's decision was a
mixed treatment and eligibility decision as described in
Pegram.26 9 The court found it clear that Mr. Pappas's injury
had occurred when the HMO (1) rejected the medical
judgment of the emergency room physician that immediate
transfer was necessary because Mr. Pappas's condition was
a medical emergency and (2) did not refuse Mr. Pappas's
request for a transfer, but rather offered three alternative
treatment facilities to which Mr. Pappas could be
transferred to handle his medical problem."' The court
noted that these types of decisions were not the "simple yes
or no" decisions as to whether a condition is covered, cited
in Pegram as pure eligibility questions, but rather reflected
the medical judgments of where and under what
circumstances Mr. Pappas's condition would be treated (i.e.,
mixed treatment and eligibility decisions) and therefore the
plaintiffs
271 state claims were not completely preempted by
ERISA.
Most courts have read Pegram narrowly and have not
altered their preemption analysis based on its dicta. In
Schusteric v. United Healthcare Insurance Co.y,22 the
Northern District of Illinois became the first district court
to consider the impact of Pegram in deciding whether to
remand a claim against an HMO for a benefits decision
based on medical judgment. The district court held that
Pegram had no impact at all on the question whether a
negligence claim of the type alleged by2 Schusteric is
completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a). 73 The district
court employed the familiar coverage-treatment distinction
to find that Schusteric's claim, challenging an HMO's delay
in agreeing to pay for physical therapy following dental
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 1093-94.
Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1091, 1095-96.
Id. at 1096.
2000 WL 1263581 (N.D. Il. 2000).
Id. at *2.

2001]

ERISA PREEMPTION

1267

surgery because it was not medically necessary, was
completely preempted. Restricting its discussion of Pegram
to the Court's holding regarding the scope of ERISA's
fiduciary duties, the district court rejected Schusteric's
argument that Pegramrequired a different result." 4
Similarly, the district court for the Southern District of
New York, in Rubin-Schneiderman v. Merit Behavioral
Care Corp., 27 concluded that a decision to deny inpatient
treatment made by Merit Behavioral Care Corp. (a
utilization review organization under contract to Empire
Blue Cross and Blue Shield) was a coverage decision, not a
treatment decision. The court distinguished Pegram in two
ways: (1) the decision was made by an independent
utilization review entity, not an HMO's own doctors or
administrators, and (2) the health plan at issue was not an
HMO, but rather a preferred provider organization (PPO),
an entity more like the traditional fee-for-service plan.276
Recently, the defendant in Lazorko v. Pennsylvania
Hospital277 unsuccessfully tried to invoke Pegram to argue
that imposing state liability on an HMO accused of denying
treatment based on financial incentives was improper
because, by recognizing that financial incentives were an
integral feature of HMOs, Pegram insulated HMOs from
liability-even state liability-attributable to the existence
7 The Third Circuit concluded that
of financial incentives."
the vicarious liability claims against an HMO alleging that
the HMO's financial disincentives discouraged the treating
physician from recommending additional treatment
involved medical judgments and therefore were not
completely preempted by ERISA.279
VI. COVERAGE V. TREATMENT DECISIONS: A NEW DIRECTION?

After twenty years of broadly interpreting the sweep of
ERISA's preemption provision, since 1995 the Supreme
Court has switched gears and appears to be narrowing the
274. Id.
275. 2001 WL 363050 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
276. Id. at *4-5.
277. 237 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2000).
278. Id. at 249-50.
279. Id.; see also Rosenkrans v. Wentzel, 131 F. Supp. 2d 609 (M.D. Pa.
2001) (confining Pegram to its facts and holding the medical malpractice action
brought by plaintiffs not completely preempted).
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reach of ERISA § 514, at least as applied to employee
welfare benefit plans. In the aftermath of Travelers"0 and
the trio of preemption cases decided in 1997 that fleshed
out the Travelers framework for preemption analysis,"' a
new paradigm for ERISA preemption seems to have
emerged. State laws involving traditional areas of state
regulation, such as medical decisionmaking, are presumed
valid, unless a specific intent to preempt by Congress can
be shown. State laws that conflict with ERISA must give
way, but to the extent that state laws do not single out
ERISA plans, nor interfere with their administration, those
state laws are likely to survive ERISA preemption
challenges. State laws providing alternate enforcement
mechanisms for ERISA claims are also preempted, but it is
possible that the Supreme Court may revisit that issue in
the future, at least when the enforcement procedures in
question are integral to state laws saved under ERISA's
insurance savings clause.282
The Supreme Court's decision in Pegram suggests,
however, that the methodology for examining preemption of
state law claims involving medical decisionmaking that has
emerged since Travelers may itself be changing.
In Dukes, the Third Circuit faced a series of claims by
Mr. Dukes's survivors that Mr. Dukes's injury occurred
because the medical providers and the HMO under which
he was covered failed to diagnose his ultimately fatal
condition through a timely blood test.283 The Third Circuit
could have looked at those facts and concluded the actions
complained of simply involved a denial of benefits (i.e.,
failure to provide the blood test). If so, that was a coverage
decision and state law claims concerning that decision
should have been preempted. Other courts, most notably
28
the Fifth Circuit in Corcoran v. United Healthcare Inc., 4
had done exactly that. But instead, the Third Circuit
concluded that the essence of the Dukes family's claim was
280. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
281. See generally Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr. Co., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs.
Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); Boggs v. Boggs, 521 U.S. 1138 (1997).
282. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Amer. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 376-77 n.7
(1999).
283. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 352 (3d Cir. 1995).
284. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir.
1992).
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not simply that Mr. Dukes was not given the blood test that
clearly was covered under the plan, but that the care he got
under the plan was substandard. The court concluded that
the claims were actually medical malpractice claims, not
benefit claims in disguise. Thus, the state law claims could
go forward and were not preempted. At the time, Dukes was
considered quite controversial and cutting edge.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Corcoran was, and
probably still is, the mainstream view of how courts
approach coverage questions. The claims before the Fifth
Circuit were analogous to those in Dukes.285 Mrs. Corcoran's
treating physician recommended hospitalization for the
remaining time of her high-risk pregnancy. But the
utilization review firm (United Healthcare) substituted its
medical judgment for that of the treating physician and
ordered instead home nursing care for ten hours a day.
During a time that the nurse was not on duty, the fetus
went into distress and died. Mrs. Corcoran argued that her
case was not about denial of hospitalization but about the
decision of the utilization review firm to substitute
treatment-a medical decision, not solely a coverage
decision. Nonetheless, while acknowledging that the
utilization firm was giving medical advice when it rejected
the recommendation of the treating physician and
substituted alternative care, the Fifth Circuit said that it
was doing so in the course of handling a benefit claim, an
act of plan administration.286 Thus, the state law negligence
and wrongful death claims were preempted.
In Dukes, the Third Circuit explicitly rejected Corcoran,
distinguishing it because although United Healthcare was
making medical decisions (at least in part) when it was
involved in utilization review activities, those activities did
not involve the actual provision of medical care or the
supervision of those who provided medical treatment for
plan provisions.
But what would happen if one were to apply the
Pegram analysis to preemption cases like Dukes and
Corcoran?Recall that the facts at issue in Pegram involved
decisions that treating physicians made on behalf of the
HMO. Those facts were similar to the situation in Dukes,
since the alleged negligence related to actions of the
285. See supra note 167 for a discussion of Corcoran.
286. See Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1331-32.
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treating physician and the HMO. Those acts would be
either pure treatment decisions or mixed eligibility
decisions under the Pegram analysis. In either case, they
would not be fiduciary acts, therefore, state law would
govern. Thus, although the result would be the same (i.e.,
state law would not be preempted), the Third Circuit would
not have to conclude that the issue involved quality of care
to reach that result. Even if the decisions were in part
coverage decisions, state law would still be applied. This is
in contrast to the general rule, embodied in Corcoran and
Hull, in which challenges to so-called mixed eligibility
decisions would result in preemption of state law.
The result of applying a Pegram-type analysis in
preemption cases like Corcoran is not as clear. Unlike
Pegram or Dukes, Corcoran did not involve a challenge to
the decisions of a treating physician. Indeed, in Corcoran,
the treating physician's recommendation was overruled. So
the question would be whether the decisions of a utilization
review entity, acting on behalf of the HMO, would be
fiduciary acts? Arguably, although it was not performing
hands-on medical treatment, the activities of the utilization
review entity were not purely administrative in nature, but
rather required medical judgment.
The distinction that Justice Souter seemed to be
drawing in Pegram was between pure coverage or eligibility
decisions (which could be made by looking at the plain
language of the plan itself) as distinguished from a mixed
eligibility decision (which required the application of the
plan's language to the particular circumstances presented
by the individual seeking treatment to determine coverage).
In other words, "Whether hospitalization during pregnancy
was covered under the plan?" would be a pure eligibility or
coverage decision. In contrast, "Whether, given the highrisk nature of Mrs. Corcoran's pregnancy and other medical
factors specific to her, was hospitalization during pregnancy
medically necessary or appropriate and therefore covered
under the plan?" would be a mixed eligibility decision or
treatment decision.28 Viewed in that context, it would be
hard to argue that even though the medical judgment was
being exercised by the utilization review entity on behalf of
the plan, not the treating physician, the principles
287. For Justice Souter's explanation of the difference between the two
types of decisions, see Pegram v. Herdrich,530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000).
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articulated by the Court in Pegram should not apply. At its
core, what the Court was saying in Pegram was that
decisionmaking by ERISA-covered health plans that is
premised in part on medical judgment cannot be considered
purely administrative in nature. Thus state law principles
applicable to medical decisionmaking should apply.
This result would be consistent with Travelers and a
natural progression in preemption jurisprudence flowing
from the application of Pegram principles, even though the
case itself involved the scope of ERISA's fiduciary duties,
not preemption. Whether the Supreme Court ultimately
moves in that direction is an open question, but given the
current Court's clear preference for protecting state
prerogatives at the expense of curbing the reach of Federal
power, 8 ' the seeds for such a further limitation on ERISA
preemption of state law with respect to ERISA health plans
have clearly been sown in Pegram.

288. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that
states cannot be sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by
their employees for age discrimination violations); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevented the plaintiff from
suing the state of Maine in state court to recover wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act).

